Current Research Interests
Cooperation
Humans possess a remarkable capacity for large-scale cooperation. Within groups, we share knowledge, coordinate actions, and establish and maintain public goods from which everyone can benefit. However, cooperation is vulnerable to exploitation and poses a social dilemma. When others do not cooperate, the optimal response is often to withhold cooperation as well. Conversely, when others do cooperate, individuals may be tempted to enjoy the benefits without contributing themselves. Our research seeks to understand how groups can overcome this free-rider problem, reveal mechanisms that sustain cooperation, and explore how group cooperation shapes expectations and trust dynamics among individual members. Furthermore, we investigate how cooperation across group boundaries can emerge.
Social Norms
Intricately linked to cooperation are social norms, which broadly encompass the implicit expectations shared among individuals that guide appropriate behavior across various contexts. Cooperation norms are particularly interesting, as they often require individuals to restrain self-interest in order to achieve collective benefits. Despite their importance, our understanding of how social norms emerge within groups, persist over time, and influence behavior remains incomplete. Moreover, groups can sometimes develop “anti-social” norms that legitimize harmful or unethical behavior toward others. Gaining deeper insights into the formation and impact of social norms would allow us to better predict the conditions under which groups are likely to cooperate, compete, or even collapse.
Conflict
Cooperation entails investing personal resources, such as time, money, and energy, for the benefit of others. However, humans also frequently devote substantial resources to hurting, exploiting, or competing with others. In conflicts, resources are often wasted, serving only to assert dominance or outcompete others. A key research goal is therefore to identify the circumstances under which individuals are inclined to invest time and effort in harming others. Particularly in intergroup contexts, understanding the microlevel mechanisms that escalate or de-escalate conflict may help break cycles of persistent hostility and perpetuating conflict spirales between groups.
Academic Positions
since 2022 | Professor for Social and Economic Psychology University of Zurich |
2016-2022 | Assistant Professor Department of Social, Economic and Organisational Psychology, Leiden University (Netherlands) |
2015-2016 | Postdoctoral Research Fellow Institute of Psychology, University of Amsterdam (Netherlands) |
2011-2015 | PhD studies Department of Economics & Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Maastricht (Netherlands) Advisors: Prof. Dr. Arno Riedl (Economics) & Prof. Dr. Rainer Goebel (Psychology) |
2005-2010 | Study of Psychology Goethe University Frankfurt (Germany) |
Selected Publications
Gross, Meder, De Dreu, Romano, Molenmaker & Hoenig (2023). The evolution of universal cooperation. Science Advances.
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Gross, De Dreu & Reddmann (2022). Shadow of conflict: How past conflict influences group cooperation and the use of punishment. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.
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Gross & Vostroknutov (2022). Why do people follow social norms? Current Opinion in Psychology.
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Gross et al. (2021). When helping is risky: The behavioral and neurobiological tradeoff of social and risk preferences. Psychological Science.
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Gross & Böhm (2020). Voluntary restrictions on self-reliance increase cooperation and mitigate wealth inequality. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
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Gross & De Dreu (2019). Individual solutions to shared problems create a modern tragedy of the commons. Science Advances.
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Gross & De Dreu (2019). The rise and fall of cooperation through reputation and group polarization. Nature Communications.
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Gross, Leib, Offerman, & Shalvi (2018). Ethical free riding: When honest people find dishonest partners. Psychological Science.
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